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COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
Amendment protects "obscene literature" as opposed to "obscene matter" 10 nor did
it discuss whether the burden of proof under the civil section- is less than must
be carried in a criminal prosecution. Both of these questions must eventually be
answered.
The statute, as applied in this case, is clearly valid, due to the admitted
obscene nature of the work involved but it is hoped that the Supreme Court" will
accept the opportunity presented to it to decide definitively the bounds of prior
restraint; to determine what, if anything, is protected by the First Amendment
other than prior restraints; and to determine the status of "obscene literature"
in the First Amendment. If this case is affirmed, it will probably cause many
states to add this type of preventive relief by way of injunction to their obscenity
statutes for it undoubtedly provides a more effective way of ridding the bookstands of objectionable literature.
Emergency Business Rent Law
Emergency housing laws adopted under the police power of the state, which
suspend a landlord's right to dispossess a holdover tenant, have been held not to
be violative of constitutional guarantees, whether the statute suspends removal
for a definite period' 2 or allows the suspension for a period which is discretional
with the court.' 3 Even if the lease specifically provides for ejectment or some other
4
dispossessment action, a statute doing away with this right is valid.'
While an emergency does not create power in the state to act in a given
10.

See Lockhart And McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the

Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 356 (1953); JACKSON, THE FEAR OF BOOKS,

121-135 (1932). It is in the field of literature that the serious problem arises.
Though there is dicta to the effect that obscene literature is not protected by
the First Amendment (Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931)) it would seem
that when a book, which can be said to have some literary merit is attacked
as being obscene, the courts must not go witch-hunting but must give it
constitutional protection by using the "clear and present danger" test (Schenck
v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47 (1919)) or, as more recently modified (Dennis v. U. S.,
341 U. S. 494 (1951)), the "clear and probable danger" test. To constitionally
restrict speech there must be a clear danger that the speech will cause a
substantive evil which the state has the right to prevent; the danger must be
serious and it must be probable. Finally these factors must be weighed against
the value of freedom of expression on the subject involved.
11. Appeal has been granted. Kingsley Books v. Brown, - U. S. -, 1 L. Ed. 2d
319 (1957). The case has been consolidated with Alberts v. California, 138 Cal.
App. 2d Supp. 909, 292 P. 2d 90 (1956) dealing with the California obscenity statute,
and Rotk v. U.S., 237 F. 2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956) which is concerned with the
constitutionality of the federal obscenity statute.
12. Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170 (1921); People ex
rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. LaFetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601 (1921).
13. Blauweis v. Kirschner, 128 Mise. 630, 219 N. Y. Supl. 662 (Sup. Ct. 1927);
Kuenzle v. Stone, 112 Misc. 125, 182 N. Y. Supp. 680 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
14. People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. LaFetra, 230 N. Y; 429, 130 N: E.
601 (1921).
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situation, it may provide the occasion for the exercise of the power.' 5 But an
emergency does not remove all constitutional restraints and a law which depends
on the existence of an emergency for its validity ceases to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change though it was a valid exercise of the police power
when passed. 16
Thus, it has been held that the state's inherent power to protect essential
interests of the public may be exercised without running afoul of the contract
clause of the Constitution in preventing temporarily the immediate enforcement
of a contractural obligation. 17 The question which must be answered-is there
an emergency?-is primarily one for legislative determination. However, this determination is not conclusive because the courts of the state possess final author8
ity as to whether an emergency actually exists.'
In the judicial determination of the existence of an emergency, the test in
each case is whether a situation exists which calls for the exercise of the reserved
power of the state and whether the remedy adopted is reasonable and legitimately
tends toward the desired end.19 It is for the court to determine if the conditions
which caused the emergency have abated and if the statute now imposes an invalid
restriction.20 Bur, the court must apply its own analysis of the situation in the
light of legislative findings which are entitled to great weight and the legislative
remedy will not be invalidated unless its inappropriateness to the situation as it
21
now exists is clearly established.
Recently22 a challenge was raised to the constitutionality of New York's
Business Rent Law, insofar as it affects office space only. A landlord, in attempting
to recover possession of office premises of tenants who held over after the expiration of the lease, introduced a large quantity of evidence to show that the legislation, originally adopted in wartime,23 was no longer valid because the emergency
had ceased. The Attorney General presented no affirmative proof on any of the
issues, relying on the probability that the landlord could not demonstrate beyond
15. Matter of People (Title & Mtge. Guar. Co.), 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E.
153 (1934).
16. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543 (1924).
17. Home Building & Loan Asosciation v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934).
18. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, supra note 17.
19. Matter of People (Title & Mtge. Guar. Co.), 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E.
153 (1934).
20. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543 (1924).
21. East N. Y. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Hahn, 326 U. S. 230 (1945).
22. Lincoln Building Associates v. Barr, 1 N. Y. 2d 413, 135 N. E. 2d 801
(1956).
23. Though originally enacted in 1945, this section was annually reenacted
with relaxing modifications from time to time. In 1948 a temporary state commission was created to make recommendations to the Legislature on desirable
modifications in the rent laws. In 1955, the commission conducted public
hearings and determined the emergency still existed. It is the 1955 reenactment
which has been challenged.
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any doubt that the statute was unconstitutional. The Court upheld the statute
feeling that the landlord had done no more than raise a conflict of testimony and
opinion as to the continuance of the emergency and he had failed to carry his
burden of proof. The Court held that where, in looking at the basis of statutes
which were enacted under particular conditions, questions of what the facts
elicited tend to establish is a debatable one, the Court will accept the legislative
determination and will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature as
long as the Court can discover any state of facts either known or reasonably
assumed, which support the legislation. Questions of wisdom, reasonableness and
24
propriety are for the legislature and not for the courts.
It is impossible from this decision to determine that the Court has retreated
from the stand which it took in Defiance Milk25 against economic restrictions.
There the Court felt that the Attorney General had to show some basis for the
statute whereas in the instant case it was not necessary for the Attorney General
to do so for the evidence adduced in opposition to the legislation itself showed
that there was some basis for an enactment of this type. This case appears to follow
the general police power principles which the Court has long followed and adds
little to the concept of the weight which is to be given to legislative determinations.
Licensing of Electricians
It has long been generally recognized that all property is held subject to the
general police power of the state to regulate and control its use to secure the
general safety and the public welfare.26 The right of an individual to adopt and
follow such lawful industrial pursuit, not injurious to the community, as he
may see fit, subject to such restrains as are necessary for the common welfare,
has never been denied.2 7 A license to engage in a traditionally lawful business
is a property right, protected by due process. 28 But a license in a potentially
harmful or nuisance-type activity is a mere privilege,- which does not constitu30
tionally even require notice and hearing before revocation.
Licensing statutes are usually classified in two ways: (1) according to the
24. South Oarolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177
(1938).
25. Defiance Milk Products Co. v. DuMond, 309 N. Y. 537, 132 N. E. 2d
829 (1956), 6 BUFFALO L. REV. 42 (1956).
26. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
27. Slaughter House Case, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Matter of Jacobs,
98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636 (1885).
28. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873); Bender v. Board
of Regents, 262 App. Div. 627, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 779 (3d Dep't 1941).
29. Lodes v..Dept; of Health, 189 N. Y. 187, 87 N. E. 187 (1907).
30. Matter of Yates t. Mulrooney, 245 App. Div. 146, 281 N. Y. Supp. 218
(4th Dep't 1935).

